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1 Introduction
India is home to one-third of the world’s
undernourished children. That is an alarming
statistic for any country, especially for a G20
member, but it is the persistence of
undernutrition in the face of India’s economic
growth that is truly extraordinary. In 1992–3,
52 per cent of infants under three years of age
were underweight. In 2005–06, the
corresponding figure was 46 per cent.1 At that
rate of decline, the MDG1 target will be attained
in 2043 rather than 2015. Can India afford to
wait the extra generation for nutrition status to
improve?2 Not if it wants the next generation to
maximise survival, minimise brain damage,
perform well in school and sustain India’s rapid
economic growth.
Growth has been very impressive in economic
terms. The past 25 years have seen one of the
greatest spurts of GDP per capita in modern
history, one that has the admiration of the world.
From 1980 to 2005 Indian real GDP per head
grew at 3.95 per cent per year. In other words, in
1950 real per capita income in India was two-
thirds of Kenya’s, while today it stands at two
and a half times the Kenyan level (Deaton and
Drèze 2009). But the contradiction between
economic growth and nutrition stagnation is
striking. It is no wonder that in his August 2008
Independence Day speech, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh called undernutrition ‘a curse
that we must remove’.
‘Economic powerhouse and nutritional weakling’ –
how does India move away from this Dr Jekyll and
Mr Hyde existence? This is the focus of the
authors in this IDS Bulletin, nearly all of whom are
Indian or India-based. The Bulletin first reviews
child nutrition in India: what is going up and what
is going down, and for whom and where? As we
will see while the direction of change is far from
clear, movement is sluggish. We then ask why
economic growth is not doing more to reduce
undernutrition. We know that income and
nutrition are not always tightly wedded, but are at
least related. In India, they seem to be ships
passing in the night. Why is this? The articles
conclude that it is a rather toxic mix of incentives
that prioritise the delivery of social inputs over
outputs and practices that exclude large groups of
individuals, including women and girls, from
access to quality services. The delivery of
nutritional services, involving behaviour change
and coordination across sectors, suffers more than
most from this misalignment of incentives,
resulting in a mismatch of services and needs. On
discrimination, the enduring legacy of the
incidental and active exclusion of historically less
favoured castes keeps the stock of undernutrition
high. In other words, the governance of nutrition
resources in India is highly problematic.
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Next, we turn to existing interventions, focusing
largely on the Integrated Child Development
Scheme (ICDS), and review how they could be
fundamentally changed to accelerate
undernutrition reduction. These articles give
some cause for optimism. Despite much evidence
that ICDS is deeply flawed (see Gragnolati et al.
2006 for a good summary of its strengths and
weaknesses), the articles cite examples of
success within ICDS that have clear implications
for the next-generation programme. Most of
these examples and innovations revolve around:
(1) focusing strongly on the infant 0–24 month
age group; (2) matching services to needs (e.g.
not being so exclusively food-focused); (3)
moving away from centralised tracking of inputs
to lower levels of accountability, including
community monitoring; (4) improving outreach
to traditionally excluded groups, and (5)
investing in the quality of services as well as
their coverage, with a special emphasis on the
number, skills and incentives of ICDS workers.
These articles also clearly highlight the
constraints to making progress in reducing
undernutrition. These include weak ability of
civil society to demand improved services, weak
incentives for ICDS to improve nutrition
outcomes, few consequences of poor ICDS
performance, and a weak ability to link ICDS
services to improved outcomes due to the weak
state of M&E, flawed impact evaluations and
very patchy nutrition data.
Does the co-existence of these two personas –
Jekyll and Hyde – reflect a failure of governance?
The articles that follow would argue strongly
that this is the case. A poor capacity to deliver
the right services at the right time to the right
populations, an inability to respond to citizens’
needs and weak accountability at the local level
are all features of weak nutrition governance.
The articles also highlight many ways in which
the governance of nutrition can be strengthened
to rapidly make undernutrition history.
Throughout the articles there is an additional
cross-cutting message – the need for a new
research emphasis on the politics and
governance of nutrition.
2 Nutrition status at the all-India level
The data confirm that the very impressive wave
of economic growth has crashed against the rock
of undernutrition. International evidence shows
that for every 3–4 per cent increase in per capita
income, undernutrition rates as measured by low
underweight rates should decline by 1 per cent
(Haddad et al. 2003). For India, this relationship
does not seem to hold. Income increases do not
seem to move nutrition status significantly, even
though they seem to translate through to
declining poverty rates.
Table 1 indicates stasis, albeit wrapped in
confusion. The National Family Health Survey
data show that underweight rates (low weight for
age) are stationary, stunting rates (low height for
age) are declining quite fast, but with wasting
rates (low weight for height) increasing. The
National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau data
indicate that underweight is declining slowly,
stunting increasing and wasting decreasing. We
cannot therefore say if undernutrition in India is
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Table 1 The state of infant nutrition in India, 1992–2006
Percentage of infants National Family Health Survey National Nutrition Monitoring 
Data (NCHS standards) Bureau Data (NCHS standards) 
Children under 3 years of age Children aged 1–5 years of age
1992–3 1998–9 2005–06 1988–90 1996–7 2000–01 2004–05
Underweight (weight for age below 52 47 46 69 62 60 55
2 standard deviation cut-off)
Stunting (height for age below n/a 46 38 65 58 49 52
2 standard deviation cut-off)
Wasting (weight for height below n/a 16 19 20 19 23 15
2 standard deviation cut-off)
Source Adapted from Deaton and Drèze (2009).
increasing or declining. What one can say is that
the movements – in either direction – are not
rapid. Given the rapid price increases of 2008 and
the current global financial crisis, the nutrition
situation is only likely to get worse. Addressing
undernutrition now is the best way of denying the
current global crisis an intergenerational legacy.
The Government of India (GoI) has committed
to tackle this national ‘curse’. There are plans to
expand resources for the main platform for
nutrition interventions, the ICDS. The political
will is there at the most senior levels. We know
which interventions are most cost-effective and
we know the age windows in which it is most
important to act. Is this cause for optimism?
Resources do need to be increased – for example
we know that one worker per ICDS centre is
insufficient. Political interest at the top is
needed to keep the issue near the top of a very
crowded agenda. But does the allocation of more
resources channelled through existing
institutions and structures under existing
incentives and governance models represent a
case of throwing good money after bad? Many of
the articles argue yes. Their case is bolstered by
the rather weak inter-state correlations between
ICDS coverage, ICDS expenditures and
underweight rates (see Gragnolati et al. 2006),
although while not conclusive, they do not
suggest strong ICDS impacts on undernutrition.
The articles in this collection argue that
additional resources must be accompanied by a
complementary effort to strengthen governance,
at all levels, to improve: (a) the capability to
deliver services, (b) the responsiveness of the
state to the needs of all its citizens and
(c) accountability to those the interventions are
intended to benefit. The articles identify a
number of institutional and incentive roadblocks
in the efforts to improve infant nutrition and
make recommendations on how those blockages
can be dissolved, sidestepped or overcome.
3 Why isn’t economic growth doing more?
How credible is the assertion that governance
matters for nutrition? What is the prima facie
evidence that incentives and institutions for
spending existing and additional resources
matter if they are to actually have an impact on
infant nutrition? One has to look no further than
the inter-state variation in infant nutrition rates
and spending on infant nutrition (Gillespie and
Haddad 2003). Some states spend more per
undernourished child and some achieve more in
terms of reduction per unit of resource. In other
words, there are choices to be made about
resource levels and their deployment. These are
both mediated by the governance of nutrition
resources.
We know that different states have very different
performances in terms of undernutrition
reduction and this begs the question why?
Harriss and Kohli’s article in this collection sets
the stage by presenting suggestive but
inconclusive correlations at the state level
between more rapid declines in undernutrition
and (a) higher elasticity of growth for poverty
reduction (capability), (b) better state service
delivery (responsiveness) and (c) electoral
balance of power (accountability). Econometric
analysis of these kinds of variables is not possible
due to data limitations. The Menon et al. article
vividly indicates the different choices states
make in terms of which nutrition gaps they
tackle. From their data, it is difficult to see how
the nature of the problem guides resource
allocation at the state level, bolstering the ‘good
money after bad’ argument. One also needs to
look within states. Several articles document
increasing welfare disparities within states, often
along caste lines which, it is argued, exacerbate
India’s sclerotic nutrition performance (see
Thorat and Sadana; Himaz, and de Haan et al.,
this IDS Bulletin).
Walton, in this issue, argues that much of this
sclerosis is due to the clash of two fundamental
drivers: the nature of the social contract between
the state and agents of social service delivery and
the complex and demanding nature of nutrition-
related public goods. He argues that there are
two social contracts which result in political
stability and wealth creation in India – between
the state and business and between the state and
social groups. Both of these contracts are
underpinned by rent creation and capture by
relatively small groups, to the detriment of
broader social welfare. In the past ten years, the
contract between the state and business has been
reformed and has reduced the rent-based nature
of it, generating substantial growth, especially at
the upper reaches of the income distribution. But
the contract between state and social groups –
state patronage in return for political loyalty –
has remained static; there have been laudable
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shifts in spending and policy, but within the
existing system. This results in effort levels
within the state that focus more on rent
preservation rather than on service delivery.
Much public action on social issues is therefore
poorly aligned with these political and
administrative incentives. Nutrition action is
especially poorly served because it involves a
complex mix of public goods (a mix of behaviour
change and more vertical health delivery); and
fragile cross-departmental alliances between
health, agriculture and women’s ministries.
While fully acknowledging the different
circumstances, Walton describes examples of
public policy reform from Mexico (on the
conditional cash transfer issue) that could
usefully influence the debates in India.
De Haan et al. in this IDS Bulletin tell us a tale of
two states, Orissa and West Bengal, both poor,
but each with different experiences. On the one
hand, there is Orissa, seemingly impervious to
external initiatives, with rapidly growing
inequality which, as the authors imply, is going to
be the main driver of change. On the other hand,
West Bengal’s leadership has embraced the idea
of meaningful decentralisation of resources,
responsibility and authority and initial impact
assessment results from these suggest that
things are improving in terms of nutrition
outputs and outcomes.
A counter view of Orissa follows and is provided
by Saxena and Srivastava. Using NFHS data,
they point out that Orissa’s average underweight
rates have improved the most in terms of
reductions in percentage points between NFHS-2
(1998–9) and NFHS-3 (2005–06). Has this
improvement in the average state of nutrition
been at the expense of marginalised groups? We
need more disaggregated nutrition data to
answer that question. We know from Sharma et
al. that low castes – Scheduled Tribes (ST) and
Scheduled Castes (CT) – in Orissa have higher
stunting and wasting than the state average, but
we do not know if these rates have declined as
much as for all Orissa. As Sharma et al. note in
this issue, Orissa is culturally diverse with 93
castes, 62 tribes and 3–4 main religious groups.
It is too much to expect ICDS alone to converge
nutrition status across these divides – other more
fundamental political determinants of
undernutrition also need to address these
differences.
Thorat and Sadana’s article confirms the
negative correlations of low caste and nutrition
and health: child mortality, morbidity and
nutrition are all worse for these groups by
50–100 per cent compared with the more
favoured castes. Differences are maintained even
when controlling for education and welfare
levels. Access to general health services is also
worse. Conversely, the use of ICDS centres
(Anganwadi Centres or AWCs) is higher and this
may simply represent an exclusion from better
quality services. Thorat and Sadana call for
ICDS to undertake a number of measures to
reach out to the lower caste children, including
locating more AWCs where these children live,
giving greater control to these castes in the
running of community health schemes, and
generating greater incentives for all to serve the
lower caste groups. However, as with Sharma et
al., Thorat and Sadana also note that the
perceptions and beliefs that fuel inequalities run
deep in culture and will require more than a
child development programme – no matter how
big – to address them.
Himaz’s preliminary econometric results from
longitudinal data in Andhra Pradesh confirm the
negative associations of caste and nutrition. She
demonstrates the persistence of nutrition by
tracking children from birth to school age. Her
results on the caste variables in her equations
suggest that the hurtful power of exclusion is not
easily shaken as childhood progresses. Being
from a scheduled caste or a backward tribe
substantially increases the probability of a child
being stunted – and persistently so. The only
other variables to have this effect were lack of
mother’s education and height both reflecting
discrimination from a generation past.
4 How to strengthen existing interventions?
The articles in this IDS Bulletin, by Ved and by
Saxena and Srivastava focus on the design of
ICDS. They show that India-wide, only 33 per
cent of children under six living in an area served
by an AWC utilise a centre; only 20 per cent of
eligible children have received even one
immunisation and only 12 per cent of mothers
received a healthcare check up during pregnancy.
The design flaws they identify include: (1) an
insufficient focus on children under two – the
critical window to address because development
losses here are irreversible; (2) an overemphasis
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on food as a determinant of nutrition status to
the exclusion of care behaviours, sanitation and
health; (3) the complexity of the ICDS leading to
heavy coordination and management demands
and services often simplified by convenience –
not by need and impact; (4) location of AWCs in
ways that exclude the most marginal and
vulnerable with little outreach capacity to
compensate; (5) the need to improve AWC
staffing up to two workers per site; (6) the need
to improve the support to AWCs in terms of
training, ICT, and mentoring of AWC workers
(Menon et al.); (7) the need to improve the
capacity of the Ministry of Women and Child
Development to monitor non-ICDS inputs
needed to combat undernutrition and; crucially
(8) a need to move to nutrition outcome
reporting, building in more credible impact
designs as part of doing business, including
community feedback for a complete service,
learning and accountability package.
There is consensus on these issues from the
articles that assess ICDS in this IDS Bulletin.
Some of these improvements are planned for the
next phase of ICDS (e.g. the two Anganwadi
worker norm, a greater focus on the youngest
infants, and greater access for marginalised
groups). But these plans for ‘universalisation
with quality’ cannot rely on mere multiplication.
Using a scaling-up management model, Ved
emphasises that the skills needed to develop an
effective pilot are not the same as the skills for
effective scale-up. Past and current scaling-up of
ICDS (at present there are approximately
940,000 AWCs with a target of 1.4 million) have
faltered because of (a) the demanding nature of
delivering the intervention (high behaviour
change content, many interventions and age
groups, need to adapt to very different economic
and cultural settings) and (b) the failure to
involve and think through the role of the
institutions intended to deliver effective pilots at
scale (e.g. an inability of ICDS to converge with
health departments – there is no cadre of staff
assigned to this, unlike in the successful pilots).
To sum up, Ved notes, ‘It appears that in scaling-
up the interventions, in principle fidelity to the
model was considered more important than the
capacity of the implementing organisations to
deliver outcomes’.
Many of the articles argue that this weak average
performance of ICDS to date reflects the supply-
side incentives that Walton describes, but also
the weak demand-side accountability of service
delivery to those they are intended to benefit.
Menon et al. describe some of the above supply
and demand incentives for Bihar and Karnataka,
giving us some insight as to how coverage of ten
major inputs to overcome child undernutrition
can fall so far short of the goal of
universalisation.
Ved and Saxena and Srivastava describe how the
supply side can be strengthened. This requires
data to make the choices about how to allocate
scarce resources that have alternative uses.
Adhikari and Bredenkamp later describe some of
the data and analyses needed to improve the
supply side of ICDS in real time and to assess its
impacts. They note that significant amounts of
data are already collected on ICDS functioning,
but they often focus on inputs, not outcomes
such as appropriate infant care and feeding
behaviours (nutrition status data are useful, but
attribution is difficult and hence should be
collected judiciously). When data are collected
they are not fed back to field workers and
administrators at the sub-State Block and
District levels. Moreover, data are often
processed by those with limited technical
capability, monitoring needs to converge across
sectors (the Ministry of Women and Community
Development cannot monitor all nutrition
relevant data), and we need to be careful about
collecting too much data (a temptation when
ICDS has six interventions and four age groups).
Sharma et al. attribute much of the decline in
undernutrition in Orissa to innovations in ICDS
service delivery. ICDS functioning may well have
improved with these innovations, but it is
impossible to say how much this contributed to
undernutrition reduction without constructing
some counterfactual scenario (i.e. what would
have happened without improved ICDS
functioning). Many of the innovations they cite
are ICDS-specific (capacity building of AWWs,
AWW reward systems, community-based
nutrition analyses, and citizen charters to help
close the gap between ICDS policies and
implementation) at the project level. But the
authors also cite the importance of institutional
innovations that promote intersectoral
convergence with the Department of Health on
immunisations, treatment of diarrhoea,
deworming and referrals.
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Kumar et al. describe a USAID funded
programme, IHNP-II operating on an ICDS
platform, operationalised by CARE. Using an
‘innovate-demonstrate-advocate-replicate’
approach they aimed to tackle exclusion,
including caste-based, through enhanced outreach
methods such as tracking those left out of ICDS,
prioritising home visits, and selecting volunteer
change agents in each hamlet to promote system
responsiveness and convergence across different
delivery agents. The authors suggest these
innovations worked, although again, in the
absence of a control group it is impossible to be
conclusive. If effective, the authors are optimistic
that the innovations are scalable because what
works for the excluded should work for all. But as
Ved notes, the level of complexity and whether or
not the innovations can be embedded in existing
institutional capacities and incentives are key
determinants of scalability.
On the demand side, Swain and Sen describe
recent efforts to generate feedback loops from
citizens to local government through social
audits in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Orissa. Social
audits are processes whereby the state and civil
society work together to monitor and evaluate
the planning and implementation of a
programme. They require a partnership between
the two. In Orissa, the social audit was led by a
CSO without the cooperation of local
government. Many ICDS deficiencies were
identified, but it is not clear whether any
improvements were made. In AP, local
government was involved and service uptake and
community participation in ICDS have improved,
although no effort to estimate the impact on
nutrition has yet been made. The authors
speculate on whether another state, Madhya
Pradesh, is ready for social audits and conclude
that not enough of the preconditions are in
place: a readiness for a shift in the balance of
power, a culture of social audit in government
programmes, strong civil society capacity, the
culture of public debate and commitments to
long term grassroots capacity building. As with
so many issues analysed in this IDS Bulletin, the
main innovations are absent in the areas that
can least afford them to be.
5 Addressing the governance gap
It is perhaps no coincidence that India, the
country with 34 per cent of the world’s
undernourished infants (Lancet 2008) has
produced some of the world leaders in thinking
about undernutrition. MS Swaminathan, is one of
those. The article outlines a domestic leadership
agenda for action on undernutrition. The article
notes the leadership demonstrated by India in so
many areas and urges new leadership to ‘make
child undernutrition history’. The ten
interventions and ten priority approaches outlined
are indeed urgently needed. Despite being
developed in a consultative participatory process,
will they influence the central and state
politicians? Will they be implemented as
conceived by health workers? The articles here
would argue only if the governance gap is
recognised and tackled head on.
Biswas and Verma go on to deliver a compelling
agenda for action on governance. Using a
conventional but useful governance model, the
capability-responsiveness-accountability model
also used by Harriss and Kohli, they outline
changes needed to strengthen governance in
addressing undernutrition. On capacity, they urge
the GoI to continue to spend political capital on
the issue and find ways to work across
Departments with the National Council on
India’s Nutrition Challenges as a potential
coordinating mechanism that needs to be
replicated at several levels. On responsiveness,
continue responding to the Comptroller and
Auditor General reports on ICDS as standard. On
accountability, stronger systems from below need
to be built for demanding rights and holding
panchayats, self-help groups (SHGs) and
anganwadis accountable, recognising that capacity
development is also needed for those duty bearers
so they can better deliver on their obligations.
Many of these critiques and suggestions also apply
to external partners. Improved nutrition is in
everyone’s interest but few international agencies
have taken responsibility up to now. There are
signs that this may be changing. DFID, for
example has recently increased their commitment
to nutrition. Their renewed focus reflects many
factors – the food price crisis, a critical report
from a UK government oversight committee, and
several pieces of analysis that were critical of their
previous efforts. As Amery and Philpott note,
DFID have responded to these critiques with new
energy and a new nutrition strategy. Their co-
funding of this collection of articles is one sign of
renewed interest. DFID’s comparative advantage
is not in funding more direct interventions (those
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directly aiming to improve nutrition) but in
making indirect interventions in the areas of
agriculture, social protection and health more
nutrition-friendly – and that requires a nutrition
strategy. DFID is also a leader on governance, and
this as we have seen is a core gap for nutrition –
both at the national and international levels.
Finally, drawing on historical experiences from
the UK and contemporary experience from the
HIV/AIDS field, the Amery and Philpott article
points out that international advocacy for
undernutrition will only grow if elites in rich and
poor countries alike can connect with the issue,
much in the same way they connected with
HIV/AIDS. One precondition for this is a coming
together of the international community to agree
on vision, messages, and roles, including
fundraising. DFID is vastly experienced in
facilitating the development of such coalitions and
I hope this is a role they would see themselves
playing in the future.
6 Conclusion and key messages from this IDS
Bulletin
So, what are the key messages coming out of this
IDS Bulletin?
First, India is the world’s Jekyll and Hyde: an
economic powerhouse and a nutritional
weakling. At current rates of progress, the
MDG1 target for nutrition will only be reached
in 2043. This will have severe consequences for
human wellbeing and economic growth.
Second, more resources and leadership from the
top will help, but the missing link is improved
governance of nutrition at the community, local,
state, national and international levels. Indeed
the weak link between growth and nutrition is
the very definition of weak nutrition governance.
Third, a number of recommendations emerge on
where and how to strengthen governance. In
general terms, these would be, to:
z open up space for public debate on social
policy alternatives to ICDS (e.g. conditional
cash transfers)
z improve cross-Departmental working at state
and national levels to coordinate multiple
nutrition inputs and outcome monitoring
z allow the Comptroller and Auditor General
Reports to set operational standards and audit
performance in nutrition
z strengthen efforts to promote the status of
women through improved education and
greater representation in local government –
their ability to make decisions about fertility,
healthcare and their own time allocation is
vital to their own health and to the health of
the 0–24-month-old group
z generate and make available more data on
nutrition status – this is the lifeblood of
change agents in the media, civil society and
government. We do not need more mega
surveys like the NFHS, but more frequent and
slimmer surveys. Annually streamlined
comparable data will support debate on policy
formation and performance and sustain
pressure on the need to improve performance.
Regarding ICDS:
z make community monitoring of ICDS – in
partnership with local government – the norm
z support civil society to find ways to claim
spaces to ensure previously excluded groups
are involved in nutrition budgeting, ICDS
operation and evaluation
z focus on tracking ICDS outputs and outcomes,
not only inputs – this is especially important
for the under twos and the interventions most
vital to them
z ICDS should engage women from excluded
SC/ST communities in actively participating
in the running and using of ICDS services
z plan for and resource the scale-up of an ICDS
that can adapt to different governance
realities
z use a more transparent rationale for the
distribution of new health and ICDS centres
to serve communities where they are most
needed and where nutrition indicators are
worst
z ICDS desperately needs decent impact
evaluations in nutrition. Before and after
surveys without control groups will not do. We
are groping in the dark without them.
These are not technical suggestions, but are
recommendations on the operational processes
and institutions that should form the basis of
future resource allocation in nutrition.
Finally, we need a new type of research
programme around nutrition governance. It
would use disciplines that are sensitive to power,
voice and accountability with quantitative and
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qualitative methods to identify and learn
whether innovations in institutional and
governance arrangements can improve the
capacity, responsiveness and accountability of the
state and civil society to generate improved
nutrition outcomes.
The existence of so many stunted and wasted
children amid a sea of rapid economic growth
defies casual observation and must seem like a
curse. But as this collection of articles has shown,
there is no shortage of ideas from within India
about what to do to lift that curse – many of
them relate to strengthening governance. In
building on some of these ideas and by lifting the
curse, the Indian government will raise the
stature of its children. It will also raise its own
standing in the world.
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Notes
* I would like to thank Sushila Zeitlyn for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this
article. All errors in this current version are
mine.
1 National Family Health Survey Data (see
Table 1 in this article).
2 See Figure 1 in Swaminathan in this IDS
Bulletin for a graphic representation of how
undernutrition happens early in life In India.
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